The key is typed in the plist, and each payload carried a string where
the top level carried an integer - which iOS may refuse outright. A test
now holds all three to the same type.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015GeH3y8fwTaTudaD88P57o
iOS is the one client none of the mail autoconfiguration reaches: Apple
Mail reads neither Mozilla autoconfig nor Autodiscover for IMAP, so
adding an account means the device probing for ports - and a probe that
meets a filtered port waits out a TCP timeout and reports the account as
unverifiable, which the person reads as a wrong password.
A profile states the hosts and the ports instead, and carries mail,
calendars and contacts in one install. It invents none of them: site.yaml
names a PACC document - the standard defined to be fetched from the mail
domain itself - and every host, port and collection path comes from
there, so the server is described in one place and the profile follows it.
The document holds no address, username or password. iOS asks for those
at install, which means one profile serves everyone with an account and
it can be fetched by anyone: it says no more than PACC already says in
public. Identifiers are derived from the site and the payload rather than
drawn at random, because iOS replaces a profile whose ids it knows and
stacks a duplicate when they differ.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015GeH3y8fwTaTudaD88P57o
Everything a site has to publish for another program to find it lives
under /.well-known/, and portal had no way to put a file there: the
catch-all answered those paths 200 with the app shell, so a client
probing for security.txt or matrix/server got HTML where it expected a
document, and could not tell a missing file from a present one.
The prefix is the one place this is safe to overlay. RFC 8615 reserves
it, and a question's id comes from a file name under questions/, which
cannot begin with a dot - so no file a repo ships can shadow a page. The
path still goes through is_safe_site_path, so it cannot climb out of the
repo either, and a miss is a real 404.
Types: an extensionless file under the prefix is JSON, which is what
matrix/server and nodeinfo are; .mobileconfig is the Apple profile type,
without which iOS downloads a profile instead of offering to install it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015GeH3y8fwTaTudaD88P57o
A MemoryStore meant every restart signed out every desk on the site
being deployed. Bearable while a desk is three people, and not the
kind of thing that gets better on its own.
They live in NATS KV now: the JetStream already under the events, the
projections, the content reload and the access questions. No new
service, no new store, and the same bucket a second instance of a site
would read if there ever is one. `create` draws a fresh id rather than
writing over a session already at that key, the bucket's `max_age`
collects what nobody comes back for, and a record's own expiry is what
answers a load, whatever the bucket still holds.
Proved the only way it can be: a store opened twice against one
JetStream, which is what two runs of the binary are.
Also fixed, while there: the integration test asserted a record's
projected state was one that `aggregates::transition` never writes -
it appends events, the desk handler updates the projection - so it
failed whenever it was actually run. It now asserts what it says it
does, that a mailed reply leaves the state alone. test.yml has been
red since 0.3.47 while publish.yml stayed green, which is how v0.4.0
went out over it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two halves of the same evening.
Uploads were one-way. A `type: file` field put an object in the bucket
and wrote its key into the record, and nothing ever read it back - a
desk showed `0aba5734-...-drawing.pdf` as a string with no link, so a
builder could receive drawings and never open one.
`GET /attachment/{bucket}/{record}/{field}` streams it. The key is not
the credential and is not taken from the caller: it is read out of the
record named, so a file is reachable only through a record somebody is
allowed to see, and a key that leaks off a desk is a link to nothing.
And there was no rate limiting anywhere. A burst of 30 per caller IP,
refilled one every two seconds, outside the session layer so anyone
over it is turned away before a handler is entered. Well above a
person filling in a form - a page load fetches several resources at
once - and well below being a nuisance. PORTAL_RATE_BURST and
PORTAL_RATE_SECONDS retune it; either 0 turns it off for an instance
behind something that already does this.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Whatever reads the mailbox publishes on portal.mail.received; portal
appends the note after checking the record exists in a bucket this
site has and the sender is the address the record itself holds. A
note never moves a case: a mailbox is the one door anyone may knock
on, so it cannot drive a state machine even if someone forges their
way past the checks. The desks show the conversation beside the case.
Tested: the address parser, every refusal (a stranger, no address to
compare, an empty reply, the same reply twice, an unknown contract),
and the whole path through a real JetStream - the note lands, the
state does not move, and no event is written.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
people: the Kanidm person lookup reads the body (200 + null is a
missing person in Kanidm 1.11).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Who may do what to what was five checks in five files: `qualifies` on
a page, `requires_group`/`public` on a resource, a desk's transition
allow-list, a self_transition's email check, the automation token.
They are now compiled from content on every load into one Cedar
policy set (src/access.rs), and every server entry point asks it: open
and submit a page, read a resource, move a record, fire a self
transition, read a bucket as the automation service, extend an
invite. Each decision names the rules that granted it; refusals and
every mutation are published on portal.access.decided, and
portal.access.<site>.may answers the same question for other apps
over request-reply (proven live against uhhm's content). The policy
validates against a fixed schema, so a content shape the compiler
cannot express fails instead of granting nothing. Identity is still
Kanidm's; the browser keeps is_qualified as a rendering hint only.
`invite: {group}` on an alternative of a gated page onboards a person:
src/people.rs creates the account, records the email, adds the group
and mints a one-time credential link through Kanidm's REST API with a
service-account token (KANIDM_API_TOKEN, in idm_people_on_boarding).
The result is recorded with the answer into the runtime's
portal_invites bucket and announced on portal.people.invited. Validated:
an invite needs a gated page and required name and email fields.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4jrCgLiKKHAEFuZUJjckH
