Single-line "log { output file X }" parses fine directly in the main
Caddyfile but not through import services.d/*.caddy - Caddy rejects it
with "Unexpected next token after '{' on same line". Verified the
multi-line form validates cleanly (caddy validate) against the real
Caddyfile.
sudo needs setuid escalation, which the runner's own unit disables
entirely via NoNewPrivileges=yes (unconditionally, independent of any
sudoers config - the earlier sudoers.d/deploy-runner grant was never
going to work). Caddy reload already works via the runner's existing
docker group membership; the service restart now goes through plain
systemctl (talks to PID1 over D-Bus, no escalation needed), authorized
by a new polkit rule scoped to deploy-runner + app@*.service.
cp was looking for the site bundle under $CARGO_TARGET_DIR/site, but
site-root = "target/site" in Cargo.toml is resolved relative to the
project directory regardless of CARGO_TARGET_DIR - only the plain
cargo build outputs (release/, front/) actually move when that's
overridden.
wasm-bindgen/wasm-opt binaries cargo-leptos downloads under
XDG_CACHE_HOME ended up owned by the kernel's overflow "nobody" uid
inside systemd's StateDirectory for this unit - a quirk of that
specific path, not anything about our shared-cache setup (CARGO_TARGET_DIR
elsewhere is owned correctly). Pointing XDG_CACHE_HOME at our own
shared /var/local/leptos-cache sidesteps it; verified with a clean
checkout + a from-scratch env matching the workflow's exactly.
Release builds were hitting rustc's recursion limit compiling the
hydrate target: impl IntoView doesn't erase a component's concrete
type within the same crate, so calling a component (or a <For>/<Show>
children closure) without wrapping the result in .into_any() lets the
caller's own type keep growing to include everything nested inside it.
AlternativeCard's requirement fields already did this correctly at
their own leaves; QuestionView's <For alternatives> call into
AlternativeCard, and AlternativeCard's own <For features> closure,
plus ResourceValue/AnswerRow's nested <For>s, didn't - so the depth
compounded across all of them. Verified with a real
`cargo leptos build --release` (was previously untested - only dev
builds had been run against this code).
Sharing the default port meant whichever context's server happened to
be running (usually the interactive shell's, via rust-analyzer's
background cargo checks) silently served the other's build requests
too - and since sccache's server writes outputs under its own user,
that meant permission-denied for whichever context didn't own it.
Separate ports keep the server processes apart; SCCACHE_DIR is what's
actually shared, giving real cache hits across both.
SCCACHE_DIR/CARGO_TARGET_DIR now point at /var/local/sccache and
/var/local/cargo-target, shared with the interactive dev shell via a
new `builders` group, instead of the CI job hitting a leftover
personal sccache server it had no permission to write build output for.
load_questions_from_gitea (content.rs) fetches question YAML straight
from the questions repo's public Gitea contents API at startup instead
of scanning a local directory - one fewer moving part in production
(no git clone to keep in sync, no separate questions-repo deploy
workflow). Still just an in-memory startup load, same as before -
served from RAM for every request, no per-request network call.
Verified against the real repo (all 5 questions fetch correctly).
CONTENT_DIR is replaced by CONTENT_REPO/CONTENT_BRANCH, defaulting to
the real questions repo so local dev needs no env override.
Also adds .gitea/workflows/deploy.yml: builds with cargo-leptos,
ships the release under /srv/app/uhhm-portal (the generic app@.service
deploy layout), writes /etc/app/uhhm-portal.env from this repo's own
Actions Variables/Secrets, restarts the service, and drops this app's
Caddy routing snippet into services.d/.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Leptos/Axum app that renders a Question/Alternative/Feature schema
loaded from a sibling content repo (portal-content). Kanidm OIDC login,
content-driven authorization (Question.qualifies), a generic NATS
KV-backed resource + state-transition mechanism (no bespoke "applicant"
concept baked into the runtime - it's all content), a SHA-256 DAG chain
tying submissions and decisions together, and the "YES - Rasterized
Lines" piece (ported from the live uhhm.no site) as the landing hero.
Bendik Aagaard Lynghaug