release v0.1.5

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -12,17 +12,10 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     container: rust:1
     steps:
-      # Not the checkout action: it runs on node, which the rust:1 job
+      # v4 built-in checkout: native Go, needs no Node (rust:1 has none) and
-      # container doesn't have and this runner doesn't inject (the v5
+      # keeps the token out of a fetch URL. Uses the job token for the private repo.
-      # run died with 'exec: "node": not found'). Plain git needs
-      # neither, and the token URL works against the private repo.
       - name: checkout
-        run: |
+        uses: builtin:checkout
-          git init -q .
-          git fetch --depth 1 \
-            "https://gitea:${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}@${GITHUB_SERVER_URL#https://}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git" \
-            "$GITHUB_SHA"
-          git checkout -q FETCH_HEAD
       - name: rustfmt
         run: |
           rustup component add rustfmt

.gitea/workflows/release.yml

@@ -19,24 +19,22 @@ jobs:
       matrix:
         target: [x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu, aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu]
     steps:
-      # Not the checkout action: it runs on node, which the rust:1 job
+      # v4 built-in checkout: native Go, needs no Node (rust:1 has none) and
-      # container doesn't have and this runner doesn't inject (the v5
+      # keeps the token out of a fetch URL. Uses the job token for the private repo.
-      # run died with 'exec: "node": not found'). Plain git needs
-      # neither, and the token URL works against the private repo.
       - name: checkout
-        run: |
+        uses: builtin:checkout
-          git init -q .
-          git fetch --depth 1 \
-            "https://gitea:${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}@${GITHUB_SERVER_URL#https://}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git" \
-            "$GITHUB_SHA"
-          git checkout -q FETCH_HEAD
 
       - name: install tooling
         run: |
           apt-get update
           apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends scdoc jq
           if [ "${{ matrix.target }}" = "aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu" ]; then
-            apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu
+            # libc6-dev-arm64-cross is a Recommends of the cross gcc, so
+            # --no-install-recommends skips it — without it cc-rs builds
+            # (blake3's NEON unit) fall back to host headers and die on
+            # bits/wordsize.h.
+            apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+              gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu libc6-dev-arm64-cross
           fi
           rustup target add ${{ matrix.target }}
 
@@ -50,7 +48,9 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           VERSION="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
           PKG="varde-${VERSION}-${{ matrix.target }}"
-          mkdir -p "$PKG"/{bin,systemd/user,man}
+          # Steps run under plain `sh`, which has no brace expansion —
+          # spell the directories out.
+          mkdir -p "$PKG/bin" "$PKG/systemd/user" "$PKG/man"
           cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/varde-daemon" \
              "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/varde-ctl" "$PKG/bin/"
           # Cross-strip is unavailable for the foreign target; native
@@ -89,3 +89,45 @@ jobs:
               -H "Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
               -F "attachment=@$f"
           done
+
+  # The uhhm Arch registry (pacman.conf: .../api/packages/bl/arch/uhhm),
+  # from the tarballs just released. On klokka: an Arch host with
+  # makepkg. REGISTRY_TOKEN is the uhhm org's write:package token.
+  publish:
+    needs: build
+    runs-on: aarch64
+    steps:
+      - name: checkout
+        uses: builtin:checkout
+      - name: fetch tarballs and pin the PKGBUILD
+        run: |
+          set -eu
+          TAG="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}"
+          VERSION="${TAG#v}"
+          BASE="${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${TAG}"
+          cd dist/arch
+          for t in x86_64 aarch64; do
+            f="varde-${VERSION}-${t}-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz"
+            # The repo is private: anonymous release downloads 404.
+            curl -fsSL -H "Authorization: token ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}" -o "$f" "$BASE/$f"
+          done
+          SUM_X86=$(sha256sum "varde-${VERSION}-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz" | cut -d' ' -f1)
+          SUM_AARCH=$(sha256sum "varde-${VERSION}-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz" | cut -d' ' -f1)
+          sed -i "s/^pkgver=.*/pkgver=${VERSION}/" PKGBUILD
+          sed -i "s/sha256sums_x86_64=('.*')/sha256sums_x86_64=('${SUM_X86}')/" PKGBUILD
+          sed -i "s/sha256sums_aarch64=('.*')/sha256sums_aarch64=('${SUM_AARCH}')/" PKGBUILD
+      - name: publish to the uhhm Arch registry
+        run: |
+          set -eu
+          if [ -z "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}" ]; then
+            echo "::error::REGISTRY_TOKEN not set - add it to publish"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          cd dist/arch
+          for carch in aarch64 x86_64; do
+            pkgfile=$(CARCH="$carch" makepkg --packagelist | tail -1)
+            CARCH="$carch" makepkg -f --nodeps --noconfirm
+            curl --fail-with-body --user "bl:${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}" \
+              --upload-file "$pkgfile" \
+              "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/api/packages/bl/arch/uhhm"
+          done

.gitignore

@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 target/
 .claude/
+.DS_Store

Cargo.lock

@@ -4491,7 +4491,7 @@ checksum = "ba73ea9cf16a25df0c8caa16c51acb937d5712a8429db78a3ee29d5dcacd3a65"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "varde-ctl"
-version = "0.1.0"
+version = "0.1.5"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "clap",
@@ -4504,9 +4504,10 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "varde-daemon"
-version = "0.1.0"
+version = "0.1.5"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
+ "base64",
  "iroh",
  "iroh-blobs",
  "iroh-mdns-address-lookup",
@@ -4529,7 +4530,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "varde-proto"
-version = "0.1.0"
+version = "0.1.5"
 dependencies = [
  "serde",
  "serde_json",

Cargo.toml

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ resolver = "2"
 members = ["varde-proto", "varde-daemon", "varde-ctl"]
 
 [workspace.package]
-version = "0.1.0"
+version = "0.1.5"
 edition = "2021"
 license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
 repository = "https://project.uhhm.no/uhhm/varde"

dist/arch/PKGBUILD

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# The uhhm Arch registry package, built by .gitea/workflows/release.yml
+# from the release tarballs (the CI pins pkgver and the sums). For a
+# from-source build (AUR style) see ../PKGBUILD.
+pkgname=varde
+pkgver=0.1.3
+pkgrel=1
+pkgdesc="Content-addressed blob mirror daemon on iroh"
+arch=('x86_64' 'aarch64')
+url="https://project.uhhm.no/uhhm/varde"
+license=('MIT OR Apache-2.0')
+depends=('gcc-libs' 'glibc')
+optdepends=('networkmanager: metered-connection detection')
+backup=('etc/varde/config.toml')
+install=varde.install
+options=('!strip' '!debug')
+source_x86_64=("varde-${pkgver}-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz")
+source_aarch64=("varde-${pkgver}-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz")
+sha256sums_x86_64=('SKIP')
+sha256sums_aarch64=('SKIP')
+
+package() {
+  cd "varde-${pkgver}-${CARCH}-unknown-linux-gnu"
+  install -Dm755 bin/varde-daemon "$pkgdir/usr/bin/varde-daemon"
+  install -Dm755 bin/varde-ctl "$pkgdir/usr/bin/varde-ctl"
+
+  install -Dm644 systemd/varde.service "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/varde.service"
+  install -Dm644 systemd/varde.socket "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/varde.socket"
+  install -Dm644 systemd/user/varde.service "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/user/varde.service"
+  install -Dm644 systemd/user/varde.socket "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/user/varde.socket"
+  # The per-user socket is on for every session, the way PipeWire's
+  # is: it costs nothing until an app connects, and then the daemon
+  # starts by socket activation. The system daemon stays opt-in.
+  install -dm755 "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/user/sockets.target.wants"
+  ln -s ../varde.socket "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/user/sockets.target.wants/varde.socket"
+
+  install -Dm644 config.toml.example "$pkgdir/etc/varde/config.toml"
+  install -Dm644 man/varde.8 "$pkgdir/usr/share/man/man8/varde.8"
+  install -Dm644 man/varde-ctl.1 "$pkgdir/usr/share/man/man1/varde-ctl.1"
+  install -Dm644 LICENSE-MIT "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE-MIT"
+  install -Dm644 LICENSE-APACHE "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE-APACHE"
+}

dist/arch/varde.install

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+post_install() {
+  echo ":: The per-user varde socket starts with your next login."
+  echo "   To use it now: systemctl --user daemon-reload && systemctl --user start varde.socket"
+  echo "   The system daemon is opt-in: systemctl enable --now varde.socket"
+}
+
+post_upgrade() {
+  echo ":: Restart a running daemon to pick up the new version:"
+  echo "   systemctl --user try-restart varde.service   (and/or: systemctl try-restart varde.service)"
+}

varde-ctl/src/main.rs

@@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ enum Command {
     /// Peer trust operations
     #[command(subcommand)]
     Peer(PeerCommand),
-    /// Push fully-present content to a trusted peer
+    /// Push fully-present content to a trusted peer, or one allowed to
+    /// exchange pushes
     Push {
         /// BLAKE3 hash (hex)
         hash: String,
@@ -116,6 +117,14 @@ enum PeerCommand {
         /// iroh NodeId (z-base-32)
         node_id: String,
     },
+    /// Allow pushes with a peer for a while, without trusting it
+    AllowPush {
+        /// iroh NodeId (z-base-32)
+        node_id: String,
+        /// How long, in seconds (at most a day)
+        #[arg(long, default_value_t = 1800)]
+        ttl: u64,
+    },
     /// List trusted peers
     List,
 }
@@ -187,6 +196,9 @@ fn to_request(command: Command) -> Result<Request> {
         },
         Command::Peer(PeerCommand::Trust { node_id }) => Request::PeerTrust { node_id },
         Command::Peer(PeerCommand::Untrust { node_id }) => Request::PeerUntrust { node_id },
+        Command::Peer(PeerCommand::AllowPush { node_id, ttl }) => {
+            Request::PeerAllowPush { node_id, ttl_secs: ttl }
+        }
         Command::Peer(PeerCommand::List) => Request::PeerList {},
         Command::Push { hash, node_id } => Request::Push { hash, node_id },
         Command::Gc => Request::Gc {},
@@ -246,6 +258,7 @@ fn print_human(data: Option<&ResponseData>) {
     match data {
         ResponseData::Added { hash, bytes } => println!("added {hash} ({bytes} bytes)"),
         ResponseData::Pinned { hash } => println!("pinned {hash}"),
+        ResponseData::Bytes { data } => println!("{data}"),
         ResponseData::Done {} => println!("ok"),
         ResponseData::Materialized { bytes, reflinked } => {
             let how = if *reflinked { "reflinked" } else { "copied" };

varde-ctl/tests/roundtrip.rs

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ fn ctl_status_round_trips() {
         max_download_bytes_per_sec: 0,
         discovery: false,
         wan_upload: false,
+        relay_url: None,
         gc_interval_secs: 300,
     };
 

varde-daemon/Cargo.toml

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ required-features = ["socket-api"]
 varde-proto = { workspace = true }
 iroh = { workspace = true }
 iroh-blobs = { workspace = true }
+# Request::Put / Read carry content inline, base64.
+base64 = "0.22"
 # mDNS/local-network address lookup left iroh core in 1.0.
 iroh-mdns-address-lookup = "0.4"
 # Interop with iroh-blobs streams and channels; both are already in the

varde-daemon/src/config.rs

@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ pub struct Config {
     /// Whether any WAN (non-link-local) upload is permitted. Default off:
     /// LAN-only posture with zero WAN upload.
     pub wan_upload: bool,
+    /// A self-hosted iroh relay URL for NAT traversal. When set, the
+    /// endpoint uses this relay (`RelayMode::Custom`) instead of n0's
+    /// or none — the sovereign hole-punch coordinator an embedder runs
+    /// on its own infrastructure. Takes precedence over `wan_upload`'s
+    /// n0 defaults. `None` keeps the LAN-only / n0 behaviour.
+    pub relay_url: Option<String>,
     /// Interval of the store's built-in garbage collector in seconds.
     /// Since iroh-blobs 0.103 there is no on-demand gc; unpinned blobs
     /// are swept by this loop.
@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@ struct FileConfig {
     max_download_bytes_per_sec: Option<u64>,
     discovery: Option<bool>,
     wan_upload: Option<bool>,
+    relay_url: Option<String>,
     gc_interval_secs: Option<u64>,
 }
 
@@ -176,6 +183,10 @@ impl Config {
             wan_upload: env_bool("VARDE_WAN_UPLOAD")?
                 .or(file.wan_upload)
                 .unwrap_or(false),
+            relay_url: std::env::var("VARDE_RELAY_URL")
+                .ok()
+                .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+                .or(file.relay_url),
             gc_interval_secs: env_u64("VARDE_GC_INTERVAL")?
                 .or(file.gc_interval_secs)
                 .unwrap_or(300),

varde-daemon/src/daemon.rs

@@ -371,6 +371,39 @@ impl Daemon {
                     bytes,
                 })
             }
+            Request::Put { data } => {
+                use base64::Engine as _;
+                let bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
+                    .decode(data.as_bytes())
+                    .map_err(|e| OpError::InvalidArgument(format!("put: data is not base64: {e}")))?;
+                if bytes.len() as u64 > varde_proto::MAX_INLINE_BYTES {
+                    return Err(OpError::InvalidArgument(format!(
+                        "put: {} bytes, more than {} inline; add it by path",
+                        bytes.len(),
+                        varde_proto::MAX_INLINE_BYTES
+                    )));
+                }
+                let (hash, bytes) = self.store.add_bytes(bytes).await?;
+                self.meta.record_format(&hash.to_hex(), StoredFormat::Raw)?;
+                Ok(ResponseData::Added {
+                    hash: hash.to_hex().to_string(),
+                    bytes,
+                })
+            }
+            Request::Read { hash } => {
+                use base64::Engine as _;
+                let parsed = parse_hash(&hash)?;
+                if self.meta.format_of(&parsed.to_hex()) == StoredFormat::HashSeq {
+                    return Err(OpError::InvalidArgument(format!(
+                        "read: {} is a collection; materialize it",
+                        parsed.to_hex()
+                    )));
+                }
+                let bytes = self.store.read_bytes(parsed, varde_proto::MAX_INLINE_BYTES).await?;
+                Ok(ResponseData::Bytes {
+                    data: base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(bytes),
+                })
+            }
             Request::Pin { hash, policy } => {
                 let parsed = parse_hash(&hash)?;
                 self.meta.pin(&parsed.to_hex(), policy)?;
@@ -533,11 +566,23 @@ impl Daemon {
                 let parsed: iroh::EndpointId = node_id
                     .parse()
                     .map_err(|e| OpError::InvalidArgument(format!("invalid node id: {e}")))?;
-                if !self.meta.untrust_peer(&parsed.to_string())? {
+                let was_trusted = self.meta.untrust_peer(&parsed.to_string())?;
+                let was_allowed = self.meta.disallow_push(&parsed.to_string())?;
+                if !was_trusted && !was_allowed {
                     return Err(OpError::NotFound(format!("{parsed} was not trusted")));
                 }
                 Ok(ResponseData::Done {})
             }
+            Request::PeerAllowPush { node_id, ttl_secs } => {
+                let parsed: iroh::EndpointId = node_id
+                    .parse()
+                    .map_err(|e| OpError::InvalidArgument(format!("invalid node id: {e}")))?;
+                let ttl = ttl_secs.min(varde_proto::MAX_PUSH_TTL_SECS);
+                self.meta
+                    .allow_push(&parsed.to_string(), crate::meta::unix_now() + ttl)?;
+                debug!(peer = %parsed, ttl, "pushes allowed");
+                Ok(ResponseData::Done {})
+            }
             Request::PeerList {} => Ok(ResponseData::Peers {
                 peers: self.present_trusted_peers(),
             }),
@@ -546,11 +591,12 @@ impl Daemon {
                 let peer: iroh::EndpointId = node_id
                     .parse()
                     .map_err(|e| OpError::InvalidArgument(format!("invalid node id: {e}")))?;
-                // Consent, sending side: we only push to peers we trust.
+                // Consent, sending side: we only push to peers we trust or
-                // (The receiver independently requires that it trusts us.)
+                // hold a push allowance for. (The receiver independently
-                if !self.meta.is_trusted(&peer.to_string()) {
+                // requires the same of us.)
+                if !self.meta.may_push(&peer.to_string()) {
                     return Err(OpError::InvalidArgument(format!(
-                        "{peer} is not a trusted peer; trust it before pushing"
+                        "{peer} is neither trusted nor allowed to exchange pushes; trust it or allow pushes first"
                     )));
                 }
                 let (_, _, complete) = self.store.presence(parsed).await?;

varde-daemon/src/meta.rs

@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ struct MetaState {
     /// Trusted peer NodeIds (z-base-32).
     #[serde(default)]
     trusted_peers: BTreeSet<String>,
+    /// Peers allowed to push to us and be pushed to, until a unix time
+    /// (`PeerAllowPush`): consent for that one thing, lapsing on its own.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    push_peers: BTreeMap<String, u64>,
     /// Hashes (hex) the user shared via ticket export: standing consent
     /// to serve them to anyone, like an `open_lan` pin.
     #[serde(default)]
@@ -164,6 +168,31 @@ impl Meta {
             .clone()
     }
 
+    /// Allow pushes with `node_id` until `until` (unix seconds). Extends,
+    /// never shortens, an allowance already held; expired ones are
+    /// dropped on the way.
+    pub fn allow_push(&self, node_id: &str, until: u64) -> Result<()> {
+        let now = unix_now();
+        self.mutate(|s| {
+            s.push_peers.retain(|_, u| *u > now);
+            let entry = s.push_peers.entry(node_id.to_string()).or_insert(0);
+            *entry = (*entry).max(until);
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Whether pushes with `node_id` are allowed now: a trusted peer, or
+    /// one holding an unexpired push allowance.
+    pub fn may_push(&self, node_id: &str) -> bool {
+        let state = self.state.lock().expect("meta lock poisoned");
+        state.trusted_peers.contains(node_id)
+            || state.push_peers.get(node_id).is_some_and(|u| *u > unix_now())
+    }
+
+    /// End a push allowance. Returns whether there was one.
+    pub fn disallow_push(&self, node_id: &str) -> Result<bool> {
+        self.mutate(|s| s.push_peers.remove(node_id).is_some())
+    }
+
     pub fn is_trusted(&self, node_id: &str) -> bool {
         self.state
             .lock()
@@ -173,6 +202,14 @@ impl Meta {
     }
 }
 
+/// Seconds since the unix epoch.
+pub fn unix_now() -> u64 {
+    std::time::SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .map(|d| d.as_secs())
+        .unwrap_or(0)
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -201,4 +238,27 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(meta.unpin("h").unwrap());
         assert!(!meta.is_pinned("h"));
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_push_allowance_lapses_and_never_shortens() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let meta = Meta::load(dir.path()).unwrap();
+        let now = unix_now();
+        assert!(!meta.may_push("p"));
+        meta.allow_push("p", now + 600).unwrap();
+        assert!(meta.may_push("p"));
+        assert!(!meta.is_trusted("p"), "a push allowance is not trust");
+        meta.allow_push("p", now + 10).unwrap();
+        assert!(meta.may_push("p"), "a shorter ask does not cut it short");
+        meta.allow_push("q", now.saturating_sub(1)).unwrap();
+        assert!(!meta.may_push("q"), "expired");
+        // Survives a reload.
+        let again = Meta::load(dir.path()).unwrap();
+        assert!(again.may_push("p"));
+        assert!(again.disallow_push("p").unwrap());
+        assert!(!again.may_push("p"));
+        // Full trust allows pushes too.
+        again.trust_peer("t").unwrap();
+        assert!(again.may_push("t"));
+    }
 }

varde-daemon/src/shaped.rs

@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ pub struct Gate {
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 struct ConnInfo {
     trusted: bool,
+    /// Trusted, or holding a push allowance (`PeerAllowPush`).
+    may_push: bool,
     endpoint_id: Option<String>,
 }
 
@@ -142,6 +144,11 @@ pub fn provider_events(gate: Gate) -> EventSender {
                         .endpoint_id
                         .map(|id| gate.meta.is_trusted(&id.to_string()))
                         .unwrap_or(false);
+                    let may_push = m
+                        .inner
+                        .endpoint_id
+                        .map(|id| gate.meta.may_push(&id.to_string()))
+                        .unwrap_or(false);
                     let ClientConnected {
                         connection_id,
                         endpoint_id,
@@ -151,6 +158,7 @@ pub fn provider_events(gate: Gate) -> EventSender {
                         connection_id,
                         ConnInfo {
                             trusted,
+                            may_push,
                             endpoint_id: endpoint_id.map(|id| id.to_string()),
                         },
                     );
@@ -208,12 +216,13 @@ pub fn provider_events(gate: Gate) -> EventSender {
                     m.tx.send(verdict).await.ok();
                 }
                 ProviderMessage::PushRequestReceived(m) => {
-                    // Inbound writes: trusted peers only, deferred while
+                    // Inbound writes: trusted peers and push allowances
-                    // metered (RateLimited invites a retry later).
+                    // only, deferred while metered (RateLimited invites a
+                    // retry later).
                     let info = conns.get(&m.inner.connection_id);
-                    let trusted = info.map(|i| i.trusted).unwrap_or(false);
+                    let may_push = info.map(|i| i.may_push).unwrap_or(false);
-                    debug!(hash = %m.inner.request.hash.to_hex(), trusted, "push request received");
+                    debug!(hash = %m.inner.request.hash.to_hex(), may_push, "push request received");
-                    let verdict = if !trusted {
+                    let verdict = if !may_push {
                         Err(AbortReason::Permission)
                     } else if gate.metered.is_metered() {
                         Err(AbortReason::RateLimited)

varde-daemon/src/store.rs

@@ -228,6 +228,30 @@ impl BlobStore {
 
     /// Export `hash` to `dest`. Returns bytes written and whether at least
     /// one file was reflinked.
+    /// Import `data` as one raw blob (`Request::Put`).
+    pub async fn add_bytes(&self, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(Hash, u64), OpError> {
+        let size = data.len() as u64;
+        let tag = self.store.add_bytes(data).temp_tag().await.map_err(internal)?;
+        info!(hash = %tag.hash().to_hex(), size, "imported bytes");
+        Ok((tag.hash(), size))
+    }
+
+    /// The whole content of a complete raw blob (`Request::Read`), when it
+    /// is no larger than `limit`.
+    pub async fn read_bytes(&self, hash: Hash, limit: u64) -> Result<Vec<u8>, OpError> {
+        match self.store.blobs().status(hash).await.map_err(internal)? {
+            BlobStatus::Complete { size } if size > limit => Err(OpError::InvalidArgument(format!(
+                "{} is {size} bytes, more than {limit} can be read inline; materialize it",
+                hash.to_hex()
+            ))),
+            BlobStatus::Complete { .. } => {
+                let bytes = self.store.blobs().get_bytes(hash).await.map_err(internal)?;
+                Ok(bytes.to_vec())
+            }
+            _ => Err(OpError::NotFound(format!("{} is not complete in the store", hash.to_hex()))),
+        }
+    }
+
     pub async fn materialize(
         &self,
         hash: Hash,

varde-daemon/src/transfer.rs

@@ -62,10 +62,19 @@ impl Transfer {
         metered: MeteredState,
     ) -> Result<Transfer> {
         let secret = load_or_create_secret(&config.store_dir.join("secret.key"))?;
-        // With wan_upload the n0 defaults apply (their relays and DNS
+        // A self-hosted relay (relay_url) is the sovereign hole-punch
-        // lookup, matching the pre-1.0 default relay mode); otherwise the
+        // path and takes precedence: the endpoint coordinates through
-        // endpoint gets no external services at all.
+        // the operator's own iroh relay, never n0's. Failing that,
-        let builder = if config.wan_upload {
+        // wan_upload opts into n0's relays + DNS; otherwise the endpoint
+        // gets no external services at all (LAN-only).
+        let builder = if let Some(url) = &config.relay_url {
+            let relay_url: iroh::RelayUrl = url
+                .parse()
+                .with_context(|| format!("parsing relay_url {url:?}"))?;
+            let relay_map = iroh::RelayMap::from(relay_url);
+            Endpoint::builder(iroh::endpoint::presets::Minimal)
+                .relay_mode(RelayMode::Custom(relay_map))
+        } else if config.wan_upload {
             Endpoint::builder(iroh::endpoint::presets::N0)
         } else {
             Endpoint::builder(iroh::endpoint::presets::Minimal).relay_mode(RelayMode::Disabled)

varde-daemon/tests/lan_trust.rs

@@ -422,3 +422,49 @@ fn push_rejected_without_receiver_trust() {
     // And the receiver holds none of it.
     assert!(!is_complete(&b.socket, &hash));
 }
+
+/// A push allowance is enough on both sides: two daemons that only
+/// allowed pushes with each other (strangers sharing a place, in redoal)
+/// exchange content without trusting each other - and the allowance
+/// grants nothing else, so neither lists the other as a trusted peer.
+#[test]
+fn push_allowance_is_enough_and_is_not_trust() {
+    let _serial = MDNS_SERIAL.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
+    let dir_a = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let dir_b = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let a = support::spawn_daemon_with_env(dir_a.path(), &[("VARDE_DISCOVERY", "true")]);
+    let b = support::spawn_daemon_with_env(dir_b.path(), &[("VARDE_DISCOVERY", "true")]);
+    let mut client_a = support::Client::connect(&a.socket);
+    let mut client_b = support::Client::connect(&b.socket);
+    let id_a = node_id(&mut client_a);
+    let id_b = node_id(&mut client_b);
+
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let src = dir.path().join("voice.bin");
+    let payload = vec![7u8; 120_000];
+    std::fs::write(&src, &payload).unwrap();
+    let hash = add_file(&mut client_a, &src);
+    pin(&mut client_a, &hash, false);
+
+    assert!(client_a.request(&Request::PeerAllowPush { node_id: id_b.clone(), ttl_secs: 600 }).ok);
+    assert!(client_b.request(&Request::PeerAllowPush { node_id: id_a, ttl_secs: 600 }).ok);
+    match client_a.request(&Request::PeerList {}).data {
+        Some(ResponseData::Peers { peers }) => assert!(peers.is_empty(), "an allowance is not trust: {peers:?}"),
+        other => panic!("unexpected peer list: {other:?}"),
+    }
+
+    // The peer's address arrives by mdns; retry until it does.
+    let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(30);
+    let reply = loop {
+        let reply = client_a.request(&Request::Push { hash: hash.clone(), node_id: id_b.clone() });
+        if reply.ok || Instant::now() > deadline {
+            break reply;
+        }
+        std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500));
+    };
+    if !reply.ok {
+        eprintln!("SKIP: push never reached the peer (multicast unavailable?): {:?}", reply.error);
+        return;
+    }
+    assert!(wait_complete(&b.socket, &hash, Duration::from_secs(60)), "pushed content not complete on receiver");
+}

varde-daemon/tests/store_ops.rs

@@ -276,3 +276,45 @@ fn reflink_when_supported() {
     drop(daemon);
     let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&base);
 }
+
+/// Put and Read carry the bytes on the socket: a client that shares no
+/// filesystem with the daemon (a desktop app and the system daemon, which
+/// runs as its own user behind ProtectHome) stores and reads back without
+/// a path either side must reach. A Put blob reads back by Materialize too.
+#[test]
+fn bytes_round_trip_inline() {
+    use base64::Engine as _;
+    let b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD;
+    let daemon = support::spawn_daemon();
+    let mut client = support::Client::connect(&daemon.socket);
+    let payload: Vec<u8> = (0..50_000u32).flat_map(|i| i.to_le_bytes()).collect();
+
+    let reply = client.request(&Request::Put { data: b64.encode(&payload) });
+    assert!(reply.ok, "put failed: {:?}", reply.error);
+    let hash = match reply.data {
+        Some(ResponseData::Added { hash, bytes }) => {
+            assert_eq!(bytes, payload.len() as u64);
+            hash
+        }
+        other => panic!("unexpected put reply: {other:?}"),
+    };
+
+    let reply = client.request(&Request::Read { hash: hash.clone() });
+    assert!(reply.ok, "read failed: {:?}", reply.error);
+    match reply.data {
+        Some(ResponseData::Bytes { data }) => assert_eq!(b64.decode(data).unwrap(), payload),
+        other => panic!("unexpected read reply: {other:?}"),
+    }
+
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let dest = dir.path().join("out.bin");
+    materialize(&mut client, &hash, &dest, MaterializeMode::Copy).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&dest).unwrap(), payload);
+
+    // Not base64: refused, not stored.
+    let reply = client.request(&Request::Put { data: "not base64!".into() });
+    assert_eq!(reply.error.expect("error body").code, ErrorCode::InvalidArgument);
+    // Unknown hash: not found.
+    let reply = client.request(&Request::Read { hash: "0".repeat(64) });
+    assert!(!reply.ok);
+}

varde-proto/src/lib.rs

@@ -20,6 +20,13 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 /// Bumped on incompatible changes; reported in [`GlobalStatus`].
 pub const PROTOCOL_VERSION: u32 = 2;
 
+/// The longest a [`Request::PeerAllowPush`] allowance may last: a day.
+pub const MAX_PUSH_TTL_SECS: u64 = 24 * 60 * 60;
+
+/// The most bytes a [`Request::Put`] or a [`Request::Read`] reply carries
+/// inline. Larger content goes through `Add`/`Materialize` and a path.
+pub const MAX_INLINE_BYTES: u64 = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
+
 /// A request from a client to the daemon. One JSON object per line.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
@@ -61,6 +68,24 @@ pub enum Request {
         #[serde(default)]
         mode: MaterializeMode,
     },
+    /// Import bytes carried in the request, base64 (standard alphabet),
+    /// at most [`MAX_INLINE_BYTES`]. Replies [`ResponseData::Added`].
+    ///
+    /// For a client that shares no filesystem with the daemon: the system
+    /// daemon runs as its own user with `ProtectHome`, so it can neither
+    /// read a file a desktop app wrote for `Add` nor write one back for
+    /// `Materialize`. Added in varde 0.1.4.
+    Put {
+        /// The content, base64.
+        data: String,
+    },
+    /// Read a complete raw blob back in the reply, base64, at most
+    /// [`MAX_INLINE_BYTES`]. Replies [`ResponseData::Bytes`]. The
+    /// counterpart of [`Request::Put`]; added in varde 0.1.4.
+    Read {
+        /// Hash (hex) of the blob.
+        hash: String,
+    },
     /// Query daemon status, globally or for one hash.
     Status {
         /// If set, report on this hash; otherwise report global status.
@@ -94,6 +119,19 @@ pub enum Request {
         /// The peer's iroh NodeId (z-base-32).
         node_id: String,
     },
+    /// Allow pushes between this daemon and a peer for `ttl_secs` (at most
+    /// [`MAX_PUSH_TTL_SECS`]): we may push to it, and accept what it pushes
+    /// to us. Nothing else - unlike [`Request::PeerTrust`] it neither
+    /// syncs the peer's pins nor serves it our content - so an app can
+    /// grant it to strangers it shares something with for a while (two
+    /// phones at the same place) and let it lapse. Asking again extends
+    /// it; [`Request::PeerUntrust`] ends it early. Added in varde 0.1.5.
+    PeerAllowPush {
+        /// The peer's iroh NodeId (z-base-32).
+        node_id: String,
+        /// How long the allowance lasts, in seconds.
+        ttl_secs: u64,
+    },
     /// List trusted peers and their current connectivity.
     PeerList {},
     /// Push fully-present content to a trusted peer, unprompted.
@@ -228,6 +266,11 @@ pub enum ResponseData {
         /// Whether at least one file was reflinked rather than copied.
         reflinked: bool,
     },
+    /// A blob's content, base64. Reply to [`Request::Read`].
+    Bytes {
+        /// The content, base64 (standard alphabet).
+        data: String,
+    },
     /// Global daemon status. Reply to [`Request::Status`] without a hash.
     Status(GlobalStatus),
     /// Per-hash status. Reply to [`Request::Status`] with a hash.